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Although the gap between law and lived experience comes as no 
surprise to most people, the divergence is especially striking—and 
disturbing—in the area of family law. Legal training quickly reveals that 
love is not a foundational element of family law, yet it can still be jarring to 
find that love has little, if any, bearing on the contours of the legal family. 
Love, after all, does not account for who can and cannot marry. Nor does 
the past love of an unmarried couple trigger the protections of divorce 
should the couple separate. 
When children are involved, we might be especially inclined to 
think that love should carry some weight in determining whether a parent-
child relationship will be recognized. Yet even here, again, love is often not 
relevant to the analysis. While an adult might feel like a parent, be treated 
like a parent, and be “Mom” or “Dad” to the child, in many states that adult 
will not actually be a parent within the law, absent adoption or biological 
parentage. For families in those states, a non-legal parent may have no legal 
recourse if a couple separates and the “legal” parent bars him or her from 
seeing the child. As a matter of law, the non-legal parent and child in this 
situation are no closer than strangers. 
Ironically, given the law’s disinterest in love, the chief hope for the 
non-legal parent to regain contact with his or her child lies in showing the 
court the love that once defined the family and continues to define the 
parent-child relationship. Put another way, non-legal parents must persuade 
the court to see the family as it once was. If the court does not understand 
that the adults and children before it once functioned as a family, claims 
that the parent-child relationship should survive the parents’ breakup have 
little chance of success. 
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The case of Alison D. v. Virginia M.1 provides an important 
opportunity to examine this complex relationship between family life and 
family law. Although it was decided in the early 1990s, the case and 
surrounding advocacy present questions that remain in play today, and the 
decision represents one significant point on the spectrum of family 
recognition decisions that continue to shape the lives of many families. The 
case arose after Alison’s former partner, Virginia, barred Alison from 
seeing the child whom the two women had been raising together. Despite 
many efforts by Alison’s lawyers to tell the family’s story during nearly 
three and a half years of litigation, New York’s highest court held in 1991 
that Alison, as a “biological stranger” to her son,2 lacked standing to 
petition the court for visitation.3 Simply put, the New York Court of 
Appeals found that Alison, despite being called “mommy” and having 
“nurtured a close and loving relationship with the child,”4 was not her son’s 
parent in the eyes of the law. 
To explore the law-life relationship, this Article presents the story 
of Alison D. on three levels. The first is the personal story of the parties to 
the case—or at least the little we can glean from court opinions and other 
published accounts; the remainder is under seal, as is traditional with family 
law cases in New York.5 The second tells of lawyering for social change 
within the confines of family law and examines the strategies used to 
present Alison’s family life within a legal framework that denied her the 
opportunity to tell her story. The third level takes the long view, looking 
both at the many legal changes in the nearly two decades since the case was 
decided and at the decision’s continued force despite those changes.6 
                                                 
1 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). 
2 Id. at 28. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 The litigation documents remain under seal pursuant to New York State 
Domestic Relations Law § 235(1), which forbids disclosure of litigation documents in, inter 
alia, custody and visitation proceedings. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 235(1) (McKinney 1999 & 
Supp. 2007). 
6 For extended doctrinal analysis of the issues presented here regarding non-legal 
parents, see, for example, J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Co-Parent Visitation: Acknowledging the 
Reality of Two Mother Families, 9 L. & SEXUALITY 151 (2000); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is 
a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 513 (1993); John Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal 
Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998); William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A 
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At each of these levels, the question was not whether Alison was a 
good parent but rather whether the courts would permit Alison to show that 
she was a parent at all.  The account here thus takes as true the facts about 
the relationship between Alison and her son that were alleged by Alison and 
largely uncontested by Virginia,7 and then focuses on the challenges 
presented as Alison sought to translate her life experience into legal 
protection. 
This multi-tiered approach to the telling of Alison D. highlights, in 
turn, the core conceptual question for the enterprise of family law that runs 
through the layers of the story: How closely should family law correspond 
to the realities of families’ lives? This Article aims not to answer that 
question directly but rather to show how the question shaped the parties’ 
interactions and strategies, as well as the decision’s impact on the 
development of family recognition law in New York and elsewhere. 
More broadly, the discussion below demonstrates that cases like 
Alison’s can and should fall into the category of “law reform” litigation. 
Most often, this label is attached not to family law cases but rather to high-
profile federal constitutional challenges to government actions, such as the 
detention of enemy combatants or the placement of religious symbols in 
state parks and public buildings. On the surface, family law litigation may 
appear to have little in common with these kinds of cases, given its typical 
focus on fact-intensive evaluations of private relationships. 
Yet Alison’s case and others like it seek to transform the law, rather 
than just resolve individual conflicts, much like plaintiffs in sweeping 
constitutional cases. And Alison’s lawyers’ central task, the same as for 
lawyers handling the prototypical law reform case, was to persuade the 
court that the status quo was unacceptable and that legal change was 
required. Her advocacy strategy had to be tailored to present a story that 
was sufficiently compelling, both on the facts and on the law, to make her 
desired reforms seem both reasonable and necessary. 
                                                                                                                 
Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. & 
POL. 89 (1991); Kimberly P. Carr, Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best 
Interests of the Child in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1021 (1992); Laurie A. 
Rompala, Note, Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests of the Child: Why Illinois Courts 
Must Recognize Same-Sex Parents Seeking Visitation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1933 (2001). 
  
7 Virginia contested the characterization of the facts but not the facts themselves. 
See infra Part II. 
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I. THE PRE-LITIGATION STORY, IN CONTEXT 
1977 was an exciting time for gay people in the United States. Just 
eight years after the Stonewall riots in New York City marked the start of 
the gay liberation movement,8 lesbians and gay men were coming out in 
greater numbers than ever before, no longer concealing their sexual 
orientation in their workplaces, families, and communities.9 In major urban 
areas, in particular, a busy world of activism and organization had taken off. 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (now Lambda Legal), the 
nation’s largest legal organization focused on lesbian and gay rights, had 
been incorporated just four years earlier.10 The longest-standing national 
lesbian and gay organization focused on grassroots organization and 
political activism, the National Gay Task Force (now the National Gay and 
                                                 
8 See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL, at xv (1993); Ken Harlin, The Stonewall 
Riot and Its Aftermath (Columbia Univ. Starr East Asian Library, Cases 1 & 2), 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/exhibitions/sw25/case1.html (last modified 
Sept. 27, 2004). Significant activism, organization, and litigation by lesbians and gay men 
occurred before the 1969 riots as well. For accounts of this history, see, for example, 
PATRICIA CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND 
GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 53-56 (2000); ERIC MARCUS, MAKING GAY HISTORY: THE 
HALF-CENTURY FIGHT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY EQUAL RIGHTS 3-118 (2002). 
9 CAIN, supra note 8; MARCUS, supra note 8. 
10 Lambda’s own incorporation story helps put Alison’s situation in context by 
illustrating the hostility of many courts toward lesbian and gay rights claims. Although 
Lambda’s founders had virtually copied the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education 
Fund’s successful application for non-profit status, the New York Appellate Division denied 
the application, finding Lambda’s mission—“to educate and litigate to improve the legal 
status of lesbians and gay men”—to be “neither benevolent nor charitable.” In re Thom 
Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (App. Div. 1972); ELLEN 
ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 1-2 (2005). That decision was reversed by the New York Court 
of Appeals on the ground that it was unsupportable, In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 
1973), but the Appellate Division, on remand, insisted on striking the part of Lambda’s 
mission dedicated to “‘promot[ing] legal education among homosexuals by recruiting and 
encouraging potential law students who are homosexuals and by providing assistance to such 
students after admission to law school.’” In re Thom, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1973). 
Lambda Legal currently describes itself as “a national organization committed to 
achieving full recognition of the civil rights of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender 
people and those with HIV through impact litigation, education and public policy work.” See 
Lambda Legal, About Lamda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 
29, 2008).  
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Lesbian Task Force), was also in its infancy, founded, like Lambda, in 
1973.11 
While these and similar organizations were focused on creating a 
new political world for lesbians and gay men, a small but growing number 
of lesbian couples were also taking steps that had been largely unthinkable 
just a decade earlier. With the help of friends, sperm banks, and doctors, 
these couples began planning for and having children together.12 Although 
these couples were not nearly as networked or strategic as the political and 
legal groups, their initiatives to create new family forms were no less 
socially and politically transformative. 
A. The Alison/Virginia Family Relationship 
Alison D. and Virginia M. were among these couples. They met in 
the fall of 1977 and began a relationship.13 By the following spring, they 
shared a home and a life together in Putnam County, New York, an area 
about eighty miles north of New York City.14 Two years later, in 1980, they 
                                                 
11 See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Task Force History, 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/about_us/history (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). The National Gay 
and Lesbian Task Force now includes within its mission a focus on bisexual and transgender 
people. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, About Us, http://www. 
thetaskforce.org/about_us/mission_statements (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). 
12 See generally ARLENE STEIN, SEX AND SENSIBILITY: STORIES OF A LESBIAN 
GENERATION 131-39 (1997). 
13 All of the facts regarding the relationship and litigation between Alison and 
Virginia are taken from the decisions in the case; interviews with Paula L. Ettelbrick, 
Alison’s lead counsel through the litigation; a videotape of the Court of Appeals argument; 
and several articles about the case. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); 
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1990) (per curiam), aff’d, 572 
N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Ettelbrick, supra note 6, at 522-32; Rubenstein, supra note 6; Elliot 
Grossman, City Boy at Center of Lawsuit that Aims to Change State Law, POUGHKEEPSIE 
JOURNAL, July 24, 1988, at 1A; Interview with Paula Ettelbrick, former Staff Attorney and 
Legal Director, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, in New York, New York (May 
and June, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ettelbrick Interview].  The videotape of the 
Court of Appeals argument can be ordered, for a fee, from Albany Law School. The order 
form is available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/VideoForm.pdf (last visited Mar. 
29, 2008). Minor, non-material changes to excerpts from pleadings and other litigation 
documents quoted in these sources are not bracketed or otherwise marked. 
14 See Ettelbrick, supra note 6; Rubenstein, supra note 6; Grossman, supra note 13. 
In the interest of full disclosure, I joined Lambda’s legal staff in the fall of 1991, 
after Alison D. was decided. Other than participating in one strategy session prior to 
Ettelbrick’s Court of Appeals argument, I was not involved in the Alison D. litigation. 
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started planning in earnest to have children. Like most prospective parents, 
they talked extensively with each other about how they would approach 
parenthood. But, given that having children was not the norm for lesbian 
couples at that time, they also talked with relatives, friends, and a therapist 
to think through what it would mean to have a two-mom household. 
Although today there are websites aplenty and a small cadre of 
well-trained lawyers to assist lesbian couples contemplating parenting,15 
consulting with a lawyer was not the obvious thing to do at the time that 
Alison and Virginia began planning their family. What little law existed 
regarding lesbian parents did not even begin to address how lesbian couples 
might provide legal protection for their families. In some jurisdictions 
today, prospective parents like Alison and Virginia can plan to secure the 
non-biological (or non-adoptive) parent’s relationship with the child 
through “second-parent adoption,” which is akin to step-parent adoption.16 
But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when lesbian couples were first 
beginning to have children via physician-assisted insemination, the idea that 
two women could present themselves to a court, as a couple, and seek legal 
recognition as their child’s mothers was not yet a realistic possibility, either 
for parents or advocates.17 Indeed, most states barely had laws in place 
regulating the legal status of children born to married couples with sperm 
from an unknown donor, let alone legal frameworks for determining the 
parental rights of lesbian couples raising children together.18 
Instead, at that time, virtually all of the limited, scattered case law 
regarding the status of lesbian mothers arose in the context of post-divorce 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., National Center for Lesbian Rights, Issues & Cases, Families & 
Parenting, http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue_families (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2008). 
16 See, e.g., Sara R. David, Note, Turning Parental Rights into Parental 
Obligations—Holding Same-Sex, Non-Biological Parents Responsible for Child Support, 39 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 921, 928 (2005) (“Second-parent adoptions are effectively step-parent 
adoptions that do not require the parents to be married.”). 
17 One of the earliest known second-parent adoptions involving a lesbian couple 
was granted in Alaska in 1985.  See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: 
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other 
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 522-23 (1990) (discussing In re Adoption of 
A.O.L., No. 1JU-85-25-P/A (Alaska Super. Ct. July 25, 1985)). 
18 The Uniform Parentage Act first addressed the consequences of physician-
assisted insemination for parental rights in 1973, but its provisions covered only married 
couples and the donor. See Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: 
Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 465-66 (2006). Not until 
2002 was the Act amended to address insemination of unmarried women. Id. at 467. 
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custody and visitation disputes between the lesbian mother and her former 
husband.19 Why so few cases? As Rhonda Rivera, an early scholar of 
lesbian and gay rights, observed in a landmark 1979 article, lesbian mothers 
and gay fathers feared losing friends, family, jobs, and, most importantly, 
their children, if their sexual orientation became known.20 For many courts, 
the fact that a mother was a lesbian was itself considered contrary to her 
child’s best interests, regardless of her parenting abilities or relationship 
with the child.21 Even if a lesbian mother was permitted to retain custody of 
her children, restrictive court orders often barred her from associating with 
other lesbians, including an intimate partner.22 For all of these reasons, most 
lesbian mothers rightly believed that they were better off negotiating with 
their former husbands for custody of and visitation with their children out of 
court, bargaining in the shadow of unfavorable law.23 
This limited case law on divorce was not particularly relevant to 
women like Alison and Virginia, however, as their children would have 
lesbian parents whether the court granted custody to one parent or the other. 
Nor were there decisions from cases involving children raised by other 
lesbian couples to warn Alison and Virginia about the risks that their family 
might face if their relationship ended. As family law scholar Nancy Polikoff 
noted in 1990, “[c]ases concerning custody and visitation rights upon the 
dissolution of lesbian-family relationships [did not begin] to reach trial 
courts [until] the mid-1980s.”24 Given how little legal authority was 
available, it is unsurprising then that Alison and Virginia did not consider 
consulting a lawyer to be an important step in their family planning process. 
                                                 
19 See Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of 
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 885-86 (1979). 
20 Id. at 886-904. 
21 See, e.g., Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1975) (stating that 
“homosexuality is a factor which the trial court could consider”); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 
N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981) (“Because the trial court has determined that both parents are 
‘fit, willing and able’ to assume custody of the children we believe the homosexuality of 
Sandra is the overriding factor [justifying denial of custody].”). Most courts simply 
presumed harm rather than considering whether the parent’s lesbian or gay sexual orientation 
actually caused harm to the child. Rivera, supra note 19, at 886-904. 
22 Rivera, supra note 19, at 890-904. 
23 For early discussion of the law’s effects on extralitigation negotiations, see 
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
24 Polikoff, supra note 17, at 533. 
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The couple ultimately decided that Virginia would be the biological 
parent and that they would raise the child together, sharing responsibility 
for the child’s care and  associated expenses. Virginia became pregnant via 
insemination by their doctor with sperm from an unknown donor, and 
Andrew,25 the couple’s son, was born in July 1981. As Alison and Virginia 
had agreed, Andrew’s surname included the surnames of both of his 
mothers. 
Immediately after Andrew’s birth, Virginia took a three-month 
maternity leave from her job, while Alison continued to work as a social 
worker to cover the family’s expenses. As Andrew grew, both Alison and 
Virginia shared in the myriad activities involved in raising a young child, 
from doctor visits and discipline to the ins and outs of nursery school. 
Andrew’s grandparents included Alison’s parents (“Grammy” and 
“Granddad”) and Alison’s grandfather (“Poppa”). 
When Andrew was two years old, Alison and Virginia had a second 
child, with Alison as the biological parent this time. Alison gave birth to a 
daughter, Amy,26 whom the couple also began to raise together. 
In November 1983, several months after Amy was born, Alison and 
Virginia ended their relationship, and Alison moved out of the family’s 
home. Like most separations, this one was not easy, particularly because 
Alison had found a new partner. Though Andrew remained with Virginia 
and Amy went with Alison, the women agreed that they would both remain 
involved in both children’s lives. They agreed that Andrew would stay 
overnight with Alison two or three nights per week and would also spend 
some birthdays, holidays, and vacation time with her. With Virginia’s 
encouragement, Alison took Andrew on vacations and to events with her 
extended family and continued in her role as one of his mothers. 
For more than two years after the break-up, Alison continued to pay 
her half of the mortgage for the home that she and Virginia had bought and 
shared, in part because Virginia could not afford to make the full payments. 
As Alison later explained in pleadings filed in the case, she viewed these 
payments as “a form of child support.” By early 1986, however, Virginia 
was able to buy Alison’s share of the house, and soon after, she began to 
limit Alison’s time with Andrew. Andrew objected to these restrictions, 
                                                 
25 The court identified Alison and Virginia’s child by his initials, A.D.M., to 
protect his privacy. I have substituted the name Andrew here. 
26 “Amy” is also not the child’s real name. Public reports of the case provide no 
information about Amy, however, other than that she was born while Alison and Virginia 
were still together; hence, she receives little mention in this Article.   
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Alison later wrote in the pleadings, and wanted to spend more time with 
her. 
The next year, Alison was offered a one-year position in Dublin, 
Ireland. Before accepting, she confirmed with Virginia that she could 
continue her relationship with Andrew during the year abroad. According to 
Alison, Virginia promised that Alison could write letters, speak weekly with 
Andrew by phone, and visit him on her trips back to the United States. The 
former couple also agreed that Alison’s parents and grandfather would 
continue spending time with Andrew. With this plan in place, Alison took 
the position and moved temporarily to Dublin with Amy and her new 
partner, Margaret.27 
But shortly after Alison moved, Virginia changed her telephone 
number to an unlisted one. She also returned Alison’s letters and gifts to 
Andrew unopened and barred Grammy, Granddad, and Poppa from 
contacting him. 
At this point, the private conflict between Virginia and Alison took 
its first steps toward becoming a legal dispute. Late in that summer of 1987, 
Virginia hired a lawyer who wrote to Alison in Dublin: “I am returning 
your latest attempt to communicate with Andrew. Please stop it. We will 
continue to return to you any such letters from you, directly or indirectly. 
You may believe this to be fun and games. It is not.”28 
In October 1987, the situation grew worse. Alison, Margaret, and 
Amy returned briefly from Dublin. Without notifying Virginia, Alison and 
Margaret visited Andrew, now age six, when he was home with a 
babysitter. They took him for a walk and gave him all of the letters and gifts 
that Virginia had returned unopened to Alison. When Virginia found out 
about the unannounced visit, she went to the local police and filed 
harassment charges. In her affidavit, she stated that Andrew “was very 
upset and confused” by the visit, and that “[f]or several weeks after, [he] 
was tearful and angry.”29 
Alison, in turn, wrote to Virginia in November 1988: “I am very 
worried that things are at the point where each of us is on the verge of 
taking legal action . . . . I can’t believe you wouldn’t agree that this could 
                                                 
27 Alison’s new partner’s name is not in the public record, so I am using the name 
Margaret here. 
28 Grossman, supra note 13. 
29 Id. There is no information in the public record about the charges, which were 
likely dropped when Alison returned to Dublin. 
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only lead to more anger and conflict, and no real resolution.”30 Her letter 
continued: 
You cannot totally stop me from having a relationship with 
[Andrew], no matter to what lengths you go . . . . You know how 
much I mean to him . . . . Is it possible for you to believe that all I 
want, and all [Andrew] probably wants, is to be able to continue 
to see each other?31 
She concluded: “Can’t we figure out a compromise that will stop 
the confrontational course we are on?”32 Virginia’s answer was no. 
B. Preparations for Litigation 
Around the same time she reached out to Virginia to try to resolve 
the conflict privately, Alison realized that she might need help in trying to 
maintain her relationship with Andrew. After first contacting a local lawyer, 
Alison called Paula Ettelbrick, then a staff attorney of Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund. As Ettelbrick recalled, “[i]n those days, calls 
just came out of the blue on lesbian parenting issues, and Alison was a very 
resourceful person.”33 While much of Lambda’s docket was taken up with 
HIV-related discrimination, Ettelbrick had concentrated on lesbian and gay 
family law issues since arriving at Lambda in the spring of 1986. Alison’s 
call was one of many similar calls from parents she would receive over the 
course of her seven years on Lambda’s staff. Shortly after hearing from 
Alison, Ettelbrick met with Lambda’s Legal Advisory Committee, a group 
of lawyers who consulted with Lambda’s small legal staff on prospective 
cases. 
Some members of the Committee were concerned about bringing a 
case like Alison’s in New York. Just a few months earlier, in Ronald FF. v. 
Cindy GG., the New York Court of Appeals had rejected the visitation 
petition of a man who had spent nearly a year parenting his then-girlfriend’s 
child.34 Relying on the fundamental right of a legal parent “to choose those 




33 Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. 
34 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987). 
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with whom her child associates,”35 the court had held that Ronald, as a 
“biological stranger,”36 was not entitled to seek court-ordered visitation 
against the mother’s wishes.37 Ettelbrick argued that Ronald FF. could be 
distinguished on factual grounds: Ronald had not planned with the 
biological mother to have a child and did not have as long or as deep an 
involvement in raising the child as Alison had. 
Ettelbrick also pointed out that Ronald FF. did not foreclose Alison 
from making equitable arguments to support the court’s consideration of 
factors not addressed explicitly by the law governing visitation, such as 
fairness to the parties. This reading of Ronald FF. would leave Alison free 
to argue that she stood in loco parentis to Andrew, a status in equity that 
recognizes adults who “[stand] in the place of a parent.”38 In addition, 
Alison could argue that Virginia should be equitably estopped from denying 
Alison’s parental status because Virginia herself had encouraged Alison’s 
parental relationship with Andrew, thereby satisfying the traditional 
prerequisites for equitable estoppel—representation, reliance, and 
detriment.39 
In addition, Alison was seeking visitation, not custody. This more 
limited assertion of parental rights might be viewed more favorably by the 
court than a demand to shift custody away from Virginia, the biological 
mother. Further, presumably, the focus on visitation could diminish factual 
concerns that might be raised about Alison having first left the relationship 
to be with a new partner and then departing for a long stint outside the 
United States (albeit in reliance on Virginia’s promise that her relationship 
with Andrew could continue). 
At this point, one might wonder about the possible tension for a gay 
rights organization in representing one lesbian against another. But the 
question has an easy answer. Lambda’s mission, after all, is not to represent 
all gay people, but rather to end discrimination and other harms based on 
                                                 
35 Id. at 77. 
36 Id. at 76. 
37 Id.   
38 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 359 (3d Pocket ed. 2006) (translating from the 
Latin). 
39 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION 
84-85 (2d ed. 1993). New York courts that have embraced equitable estoppel as a basis for 
according standing to a non-legal parent typically consider the adult’s tenure in the home 
with the child, the adult’s provision of support for the child’s welfare, and the child’s best 
interests. See Ettelbrick, supra note 6, at 524 & nn.46-48. 
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sexual orientation.40 This mission includes reforming the law to secure the 
rights of families created by lesbian and gay couples,41 which was exactly 
what Alison sought to do. To the extent Virginia was taking advantage of 
the law’s failure to recognize the families of same-sex couples, her position 
denied the reality of the family she created with Alison and was, in 
Lambda’s view, contrary to the organization’s aims. In late 1987, Lambda 
told Alison it would take her case. 
Virginia was represented by Anthony G. Maccarini, a lawyer in 
private practice in Putnam County, New York, who presumably charged his 
standard fees (unlike Lambda, which represents its clients without 
charge).42 At the time, organizations that actively opposed recognition of 
the rights of gay people, such as the Moral Majority,43 were forceful public 
players but did not ordinarily involve themselves in family law cases.44 
Today, by contrast, numerous organizations, such as the Alliance Defense 
Fund (ADF),45 describe themselves as dedicated to preserving the 
“traditional family,” and some of these groups focus intensively on the 
courts as a forum for opposing the rights of lesbian and gay parents and 
couples.46 Although Alison and Virginia’s conflict would have been a 
complicated case for an organization like ADF to handle because Virginia 
had not disavowed being a lesbian, a “traditional family” organization 
might still have sought to participate in some way to support Virginia’s 
restrictive interpretation of the state’s family law.47 
                                                 
40 See Lambda Legal, About Lambda Legal, supra note 10. 
41 Id. 
42 See Lamda Legal, Support Lambda Legal, https://secure.ga3.org/01/donate2 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2008) (“We do not charge our plaintiffs.”). 
43 See Moral Majority, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2007). 
44 Cf. id. (noting that the Moral Majority was a “political action group” which 
engaged in tasks such as lobbying). 
45 Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), http://www.alliancedefensefund.org (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2008). 
46 The ADF’s “Traditional Family” Project, for example, describes its work as 
fighting to preserve the “traditional family” against incursions by, among others, lesbians 
and gay men. See Alliance Defense Fund, Protecting Family Values, 
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/issues/TraditionalFamily/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 
29, 2008). 
47 In a case in which a child’s biological mother had announced that she was no 
longer a lesbian, an ADF-affiliated attorney represented the woman against her former civil 
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Alison and Lambda needed a private, local lawyer on their side as 
well. As Lambda was a New York City-based organization with a national 
agenda, its standard practice included incorporating the pro bono services of 
a local cooperating attorney on all of its cases. This was particularly 
important for family law cases like Alison’s. A cooperating attorney could 
bring familiarity with the upstate court’s rules and practices but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, a local attorney could help ensure that the court 
saw Alison as an individual with her child’s best interests at heart rather 
than as a front for a broader political battle about gay rights. 
In the 1980s it was not an easy feat to find a lawyer in upstate New 
York willing to represent a lesbian seeking to sue another lesbian for 
visitation with the couple’s child. Many lawyers had little idea that lesbian-
parented families even existed, and of those who did, most were either 
hostile or completely pessimistic about the prospects for success.48 
Ettelbrick reached out to Noel Tepper, a solo practitioner in Poughkeepsie 
with a reputation for taking on “unusual” cases.49 Tepper quickly signed on 
as a pro bono cooperating attorney for Lambda in the case. 
II. THE FIRST STAGES OF THE LITIGATION 
A. Framing the Case 
The question of how to frame the case—or, more precisely, how to 
structure Alison’s petition to the court—was critical. To succeed, the 
lawyers had to make a strong doctrinal showing to persuade the court that 
the law could recognize Alison and Andrew’s relationship. At the same 
time, their presentation of the case had to be attentive to an array of non-
doctrinal factors, since most judges had no experience with visitation 
petitions by the non-biological mothers of children born into two-mother 
households. 
                                                                                                                 
union partner, with whom she had been raising the child. See Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808 
(Utah 2007). For further discussion of the case, see infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
After the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the biological mother’s favor, the ADF’s press release 
proclaimed “A HUGE Victory For a Mother and Daughter . . . A HUGE Defeat for the 
Homosexual Legal Agenda . . . !” http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/updates/ 
2007_0220.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
48 See generally Rivera, supra note 19 (describing the generally unfavorable legal 
position of gay people in civil matters in the late 1970s). 
49 Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. 
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If Alison and Virginia had been married, this step in the litigation 
would not have required high-level strategizing. Alison would have filed for 
divorce and, within that familiar governing framework, custody and 
visitation regarding the children born during the marriage would have been 
decided by a New York family court judge based on the best interests of the 
child.50 
But Alison and Virginia were not married and could not have 
married.51 Their relationship was not visible within the traditional scope of 
family law. Consequently, they did not have the benefit of existing divorce 
and custody law to govern the conflict over visitation.52 Moreover, because 
Alison and Andrew lacked a biological or adoptive connection, they had no 
formal legal relationship. 
Thus, Alison’s lawyers faced difficult questions as they strategized 
about how best to present Alison’s claims. How much, if at all, would it 
matter that Alison and Virginia were a lesbian couple as opposed to an 
unmarried heterosexual couple? Should the petition acknowledge that, in 
some respects, Alison’s claim was on the cutting edge? Or, by contrast, 
should it frame the case as involving roughly the same issues as any run-of-
the-mill parenting dispute? Addressing these competing concerns required 
something of a balancing act both at the initial pleading stage and 
throughout the course of the litigation. 
                                                 
50 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (2007) (requiring custody and visitation 
determinations to be made, subject to certain provisions, with “regard to the circumstances of 
the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child”). 
51 Articles 2 and 3 of Chapter 14 of New York Domestic Relations Law govern 
marriage in New York State. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW ch. 14, art. 2-3 (2007). Although the 
statutory provisions did not explicitly preclude same-sex couples from marrying at the time 
of Alison and Virginia’s conflict, no state court or legislature had even come close to 
recognizing marriage rights for same-sex partners.  See CAIN, supra note 8, at 160-62 
(describing efforts by same-sex couples to secure marriage rights during the 1970s); Rivera, 
supra note 19, at 904-06 (noting, in 1979, that “[t]he Supreme Court’s acceptance of . . . a 
quasi-marital status does not appear to be imminent”). Confirming this view of the statute, 
the New York Court of Appeals held in 2006 that, in light of the common understanding of 
marriage at the time Articles 2 and 3 were written in 1909, the relevant Domestic Relations 
Law provisions “clearly limit[] marriage to opposite-sex couples.” Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006). 
52 Although divorce law might not be recognized widely as a “benefit” of 
marriage, its structure and background rules often provide invaluable assistance to 
individuals seeking to restructure their lives after the end of a relationship. See generally 
Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 625 (1988). 
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Ettelbrick and Tepper decided to bring Alison’s claim as a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.53 In New York, Section 70 of the Domestic 
Relations Law specifically authorizes habeas petitions in disputes about 
child custody and visitation, providing that “either parent may apply to the 
supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus . . . [and] the court, on due 
consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of 
such child to either parent.”54 But was Alison a “parent” within this 
provision? This question became the central issue in the case. 
Alison’s petition seeking visitation with Andrew, filed in a New 
York Supreme Court in March 1988, described in detail the commitment 
between Alison and Virginia, their decision to have a child together, their 
agreement that both women would be Andrew’s parents even though 
                                                 
53 Although best known as the petition filed by prisoners who believe that they 
have been wrongly detained by the state, see, e.g., Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 36 
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 875 (2007), habeas petitions are available whenever a 
party believes that a person is being unlawfully restrained by someone else, including a 
private actor such as a parent. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 
2007). 
54 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). 
The statute provides, in relevant part: 
(a) Where a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may 
apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such 
minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the 
court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge 
and custody of such child to either parent for such time, under such 
regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions and directions, as 
the case may require, and may at any time thereafter vacate or modify 
such order. In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody 
of the child in either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is 
for the best interest of the child, and what will best promote its welfare 
and happiness, and make award accordingly. 
(b) Any order under this section which applies to rights of visitation with 
a child . . . shall be enforceable . . . against any person or official having 
care or custody . . . of such child.  
Id. Although section 70 did not mention visitation at the time Alison filed her 
petition, it had been construed to cover visitation petitions as well. See Alison D. v. Virginia 
M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (App. Div. 1990) (per curiam) (citing In re Pierson, 511 
N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1987)). 
For historical background on the use of habeas proceedings in child custody and 
visitation litigation, see generally Paul J. Buser, Habeas Corpus Litigation in Child Custody 
Matters: An Historical Mine Field, 11 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1 (1993). 
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Virginia was Andrew’s birth parent, and their sharing of parental 
responsibilities.55 Its “thick” description aimed to show a judge who might 
be unfamiliar with lesbian couples and their children that Alison had been 
as much Andrew’s parent as Virginia, and that function, not biology, should 
guide the evaluation of Alison and Andrew’s relationship.56 At the same 
time, the petition suggested that Alison’s claim was, at its core, much the 
same as the claims of other parents seeking visitation with their children.57 
In response to Alison’s petition, Virginia maintained that biology 
was all that mattered. “Someone who has no biological tie to the child has 
no visitation rights,” Anthony Maccarini argued on her behalf.58 Erasing 
any trace of familial relationship, he added: “What right does the former co-
tenant of a house have to see the child of the other?”59 
B. The Trial Court Decision and the First Appeal 
On March 23, 1988, Ettelbrick and Tepper appeared before acting 
Supreme Court Justice James D. Benson to present argument on Alison’s 
behalf. As it turned out, none of their strategizing appeared to influence the 
outcome. Immediately after the lawyers presented their arguments, Judge 
Benson ruled from the bench. His decision—a mere page and a half of court 
transcript, which amounted to about three minutes of oral presentation—
dismissed Alison’s petition outright, finding “no allegations upon which the 
relief that is requested could be granted within the law of the State of New 
York.”60 Noting that “the biological parent of a child is the parent within the 
meaning of the statute,” Judge Benson cited Ronald FF. and “decline[d] to 
adopt the definition of parent as someone standing in loco parentis.”61 
Neither Alison nor her lawyers were greatly surprised at the 
outcome, and they quickly appealed. Because appeals from the 
Poughkeepsie trial court were heard in New York’s Second Department in 
Brooklyn, Tepper stepped aside and Ettelbrick brought in Deborah 
                                                 
55 Grossman, supra note 13; Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. 
56 Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. 




61 Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. 
2008] Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation 323 
 
Rothberg, an associate at a large Manhattan firm, to take on the cooperating 
attorney role. In 1988, most large firms had yet to take on a lesbian or gay 
rights case on a pro bono basis.62 Rothberg, who had been a New York 
University Law School student when she first met Ettelbrick, convinced her 
colleagues at the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue to take the case. 
The appeal presented Alison’s lawyers with an opportunity to brief 
the issues in the case more thoroughly than they had at the trial level, which 
meant that the strategy questions present from the outset had to be 
considered with care once again. Alison’s lawyers had to ensure that the 
court had enough information to understand the seemingly “new” type of 
family at the center of this case. At the same time, however, they had to 
show that Alison, as a parent in this family, fit well within traditional family 
law principles and stood in loco parentis to Andrew, which would give her 
standing to seek visitation with her son. 
Since most courts had not yet encountered families like Alison’s,63 
Lambda’s brief for Alison, like its briefs in other early lesbian custody and 
visitation disputes, would have begun not with doctrinal arguments, but 
rather with background information about lesbian couples forming families 
and having children together.64 This part of the brief would have described 
physician-assisted insemination and informed the court that as many as 
twenty thousand women each year became pregnant in this way, including a 
growing number of lesbians.65 It also would have explained the use of the 
term “co-parent” for Alison as a means of recognizing (and challenging) the 
binary distinction between legal and non-legal parents.66 While this 
information was basic—a sort of Lesbian Parenting 101—it was also 
essential in showing that Alison was Andrew’s parent. 
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 See generally Polikoff, supra note 17 (discussing the genesis and development 
of legal arguments regarding the meaning of parenthood). 
64 See Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. As noted earlier, the entire record is 
sealed. Discussion here, therefore, does not cite to the briefs filed in the case but relies 
instead on the interviews and articles cited previously. 
65 A brief written at the time Alison’s brief was prepared would have contained the 
type of information cited in Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of 
the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 669 n.1 (1985) (explaining the process and 
increasingly widespread use of physician-assisted insemination). Sources available at the 
time to show the numbers of lesbians having children included, for example, DONNA J. 
HITCHENS, LESBIANS CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL ISSUES IN DONOR INSEMINATION 
(1984); CHERI PIES, CONSIDERING PARENTHOOD: A WORKBOOK FOR LESBIANS (1985). 
66 See HITCHENS, supra note 65, at 105. 
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The brief also would have situated lesbian parents like Alison 
within a broader phenomenon of family diversity, pointing out that many 
families are better understood by function than by form.67 Consequently, the 
brief would have urged that children’s interests are best served by 
preserving emotional bonds with the adults they depend on for love, 
parenting, and support. 
Even with these points in place, a crucial practical and theoretical 
question remained: Who should be considered a functional parent? Courts, 
after all, tend to prefer bright-line rules to case-by-case formulations.68 
While no brief could answer this question for all family configurations, 
Alison’s brief emphasized three important factors: intent, experience, and 
voluntariness.69 It explained that Alison and Virginia both intended to 
parent jointly, that they did parent jointly, and that over the course of six 
years, Virginia had voluntarily created and actively encouraged the 
development of an emotional and psychological parent-child bond between 
Alison and Andrew. Accordingly, Alison argued, Virginia should be 
estopped from treating her as anything other than a parent. Framing the 
story in this way also helped Alison show that she was in a materially 
different position than the functional father in Ronald FF. because Alison, 
unlike Ronald, had planned for Andrew’s birth, had been in Andrew’s life 
                                                 
67 A child support case, Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fam. Ct. 1985), 
helps illustrate Alison’s point. In Karin T., the family court required Michael, who presented 
herself to the world as male, but was legally female, to provide child support for two 
children born to Karin by donor insemination while Karin and Michael were in a relationship 
(during which they had obtained a marriage license and had a marriage ceremony). Id. at 
781, 784. Defending against a child support claim by the Department of Social Services, 
Michael had argued that she was a woman and was not biologically or legally related to the 
children. The family court found Michael liable on an equitable estoppel theory, concluding 
that Michael’s conduct “certainly brought forth these offspring as if done biologically.” Id. at 
784. 
Although a court might have perceived Karin T.’s facts to be even more “unusual” 
than Alison’s, which in turn might have provoked some litigators to avoid mentioning the 
case for fear it would spark even greater skepticism of Alison’s claim, relying on Karin T. 
had two distinct benefits. It showed—in a case further removed from the mainstream than 
Alison’s—that a New York court was capable of recognizing a functional family. Moreover, 
because Alison was seeking to claim rather than avoid responsibility for her son, the contrast 
with Michael’s conduct worked in her favor. 
68 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social 
Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002). 
69 Discussion of the brief here is based on my construction of the arguments from 
the appellate decision and the sources cited in note 13 supra. 
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from the moment he was born, and had continued in a parental role over the 
course of many years. 
Alison also had new New York case law to support her claim.  The 
summer after Judge Benson’s terse ruling, the New York Court of Appeals 
held, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., that a gay couple should be treated 
as a “family” under New York City’s rent control regulations.70  
Specifically, the court held that the surviving partner of a couple that had 
lived together in a rent-controlled apartment could succeed to his deceased 
partner’s lease (a valuable commodity in the New York real estate 
market).71 The court had explicitly embraced a functional approach to the 
case, holding that “the term ‘family’ . . . should not be rigidly restricted to 
those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for 
instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order.”72 Although Braschi 
arose in the housing context, the decision seemed to bode well for Alison’s 
claim. The Braschi holding, after all, demonstrated the Court of Appeals’ 
capacity to look beyond narrow legal categories to give legal effect to the 
relationship of a gay couple. If it could do that for real estate, perhaps it 
could be persuaded to do the same in the context of a parent-child 
relationship, where the harm from a loss would arguably be much greater. 
To bolster this array of arguments, Ettelbrick solicited two amicus 
briefs. The first, from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the 
New York Civil Liberties Union, rounded out the constitutional support for 
Alison’s visitation claim.73 The second, from the Gay and Lesbian Parents 
Coalition International and several other family organizations, provided an 
expanded portrait of gay- and lesbian-parented families.74 
For her part, Virginia presumably argued that Ronald FF. governed 
Alison’s claim and that the statutory language of Section 70 did not allow 
for the term “parent” to include an adult unrelated by biology or adoption.75 
                                                 
70 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
71 Id. at 52-55. 
72 Id. at 53. 
73 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 321 (App. Div. 1990) (per 
curiam), aff’d, 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. 
74 See Alison D., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 321; Ettelbrick Interview, supra note 13. 
75 Although Alison’s claims can be gleaned from the decision in the case and some 
of the articles about it, little has been written to elaborate Virginia’s arguments. Still, based 
on the doctrine available at the time, the appellate court’s ruling, and related resources, see 
supra note 13, these arguments are likely to mirror those that Virginia either made or 
considered making. 
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Although that argument could have stood alone, she might have made a 
“slippery slope” public policy argument as well, suggesting that any 
broadening of the definition could potentially harm legal parents by opening 
them up to visitation demands from any adult whom they had invited into 
their children’s lives. 
As another option, Virginia could have portrayed Alison as a “bad” 
adult who lacked serious intent to maintain a familial relationship, because 
she first left the relationship and then left the country. It is unlikely, though, 
that Virginia pursued this approach.  Discussing these facts would have 
invited the court to consider Alison’s conduct—which would, in turn, have 
diminished Virginia’s argument that Alison was not entitled to have the 
facts of her relationship with Andrew considered at all. 
C. A Second Loss: The Appellate Division Decision 
Notwithstanding Alison’s functional analysis, Virginia’s position 
prevailed; three of the four Appellate Division justices found themselves 
constrained by Ronald FF.76 They recognized that the Ronald FF. opinion 
had not addressed the in loco parentis argument that was at the heart of 
Alison’s case.77 But, the court held, Alison’s arguments did “not, in their 
factual underpinnings[] or legal analyses[,] differ [from Ronald’s] in any 
material way.”78 Braschi’s functional analysis of family was also unavailing 
according to the majority, which characterized the case as a mere “dispute 
over tenancy rights to a rent-controlled apartment.”79 The appellate court’s 
brief opinion also summarily rejected Alison’s equitable estoppel theory 
and the constitutional arguments advanced by the ACLU.80 
In a rhetorical move that has now become standard for courts 
denying familial status to lesbians and gay men,81 the Appellate Division 
stressed that the decision intended no disrespect to Alison personally by 
stating: “We do not, by virtue of our determination on this issue, minimize, 
in any way, the close and loving relationship that the petitioner has 
                                                 
76 Alison D., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 322-24.   




81 See, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 819 (Utah 2007). 
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apparently developed with the child.”82 This acknowledgment provided 
little comfort to Alison, who remained barred from seeing her son. 
The only bright note for Alison was Justice Sybil Hart Kooper’s 
dissent. Justice Kooper characterized Alison’s case as consistent with New 
York’s in loco parentis doctrine83 and with Braschi, which looked beyond 
“‘fictitous [sic] legal distinctions or genetic history’” and instead examined 
the “‘reality of family life.’”84 Justice Kooper also rejected the argument 
that allowing standing to functional parents would lead to a slippery slope 
of problems for legal parents: 
As to the assertion that such a holding would open the door to a 
potentially limitless series of applications, I am confident that the 
trial courts, in the sound exercise of their discretion, will not 
lightly infringe upon the favored rights of a natural parent and 
that a searching inquiry into the best interests of the child will 
forestall any unwarranted interference with that relationship.85 
III. LITIGATION AT THE STATE HIGH COURT 
Five weeks later, Alison’s lawyers filed their request for leave to 
appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. In press releases and public 
comments regarding the appeal, they stressed that the case would “heavily 
influence thinking about the changing face of legally-recognized families 
across the nation.”86 They also emphasized the larger universe of children 
who might be cut off from a loving parent under the appellate court’s 
ruling, stating, “‘The notion that only biological parents can seek visitation 
or custody is not only unfair and absurd, but profoundly unrealistic in a 
world where children grow up in many kinds of families.’”87  The court 
                                                 
82 Alison D., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 324. Adding insult to injury, the court suggested that 
Alison had offered strong facts to support her claim: “Indeed, had the petitioner come within 
the meaning of the term ‘parent’ contained in Domestic Relations Law § 70, her claim for 
visitation would have been worthy of serious consideration.” Id. 
83 Id. at 325-26 (Kooper, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. (Kooper, J., dissenting) (quoting Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 
53 (N.Y. 1989)). 
85 Id. at 327-28. 
86 Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Lambda 
Appeals Precedent-Setting Parenting Case for Lesbian Non-Biological Mother (Oct. 29, 
1990) (on file with the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law). 
87 Id. (quoting Paula Ettelbrick). 
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granted review, putting a case involving a lesbian-parented family on the 
state high court’s docket for the very first time. 
A. Strategy Questions Redux 
Alison now had her last chance to persuade a court to see her 
relationship with Andrew as parental and to recognize that she and Andrew 
were not a pair of legal strangers, but rather a mother and her son. It was 
now the fall of 1990, seven years after Alison and Virginia had ended their 
relationship and roughly three years since Virginia began to block Alison 
from contacting Andrew. 
Within those few years, lesbian parents had come increasingly into 
the public spotlight. A 1990 Newsweek article announced that as many as 
ten thousand lesbians had borne children into single or two-parent lesbian 
households and that hundreds of others had adopted children.88 At least a 
half-dozen articles featuring lesbian parents had appeared in major national 
newspapers since 1989.89 And with every passing year, courts in New York 
and elsewhere faced an increasing number of cases involving diverse family 
forms,90 of which families like Alison’s were just one type. 
Among the important strategy questions for Alison’s lawyers at this 
stage was (yet again) what to do about Ronald FF. Both courts below had 
treated Ronald FF. as controlling the outcome in Alison’s case, suggesting 
strongly that the briefs to the Court of Appeals should devote immediate 
and significant attention to distinguishing it. On the other hand, an 
argument focusing first on legal distinctions between the visitation theories 
advanced in Ronald FF. and those advanced in Alison’s case, without the 
surrounding framework of Alison’s family story, would be unlikely to gain 
much traction. Moreover, by discussing Ronald FF. only later in the briefs, 
                                                 
88 Jean Seligman, Variations on a Theme, NEWSWEEK, SPECIAL ED., Winter 1990-
Spring 1991, at 39. 
89 See Jane Meredith Adams, Gay Couples Begin a Baby Boom, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 6, 1989, at 2; Patrice Gaines-Carter & Amy Stevens, Gay Pride March to Mark 
Milestones on Road to Acceptance, WASH. POST, June 18, 1989, at D1; Ann Hagedorn & 
Amy Dockser Marcus, Case in California Could Expand Legal Definition of Parenthood, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1989, at B10; Gina Kolata, Lesbian Partners Find the Means to be 
Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1989, at A13; Jonathan Mandell, The Lesbian Baby Boom: 
Many Lesbian Couples Have Decided There’s No Reason to be Childless, NEWSDAY, July 
13, 1989, at 4; David Margolick, Lesbian Child-Custody Cases Test Frontiers of Family 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at A1. 
90 See Craig W. Christenson, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay 
and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299 (1997). 
2008] Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation 329 
 
Alison’s lawyers could signal their view that the decision did not govern 
here. Then again, unless the court could see its way around Ronald FF., 
even the most well-constructed, heart-wrenching narrative would not be 
heard. From this perspective, a strong doctrinal distinction between Ronald 
FF. and Alison’s case would have to come first. 
Of course, like many litigation choices, the actual effects of the one 
made here cannot be known. Instead, the value of reflecting on the 
possibilities comes in the reminder that the litigation choices made in the 
midst of a law reform case are frequently neither obvious nor easy. 
B. The Multiple Roles of Amici Curiae 
At this final stage of the litigation, Lambda began a focused effort 
to gather amicus briefs in support of Alison’s position.91 The amici had 
several roles to play. First and most obviously, their briefs brought before 
the court arguments and information that Alison’s brief could not include 
either because of page limits or because of the risk that the additional 
material would distract from her central claims. Each of the six amicus 
briefs filed in support of Alison’s position focused on distinct points, 
ranging from constitutional arguments by the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union, to extended discussion of 
Braschi and equitable doctrines by the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, to the connection between functional parenthood and children’s 
best interests by National Organization of Women Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (NOW LDEF).92 Others provided more information about 
lesbian and gay parenting cases, about the substantial interest of children 
                                                 
91 On the value of amicus briefs, see Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 293 
F.3d 128, 131-33 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing the view that amici must be impartial as 
“outdated” and rejecting the contention that amici should be permitted to file briefs only 
when parties are inadequately represented); Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the 
Court or Nuisances?, LITIG., Fall 2006, at 5 (outlining reasons why amicus briefs “can often 
be extremely helpful to the courts”); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law 
Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004) (detailing the value of 
amicus briefs in Supreme Court litigation). But see Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 
339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (criticizing amicus briefs that duplicate party 
arguments or are “used to make an end run around court-imposed limitations on the length of 
parties’ briefs”). 
92 Amici curiae on Alison’s behalf also included the Gay and Lesbian Parents 
Coalition International et al., “Concerned Academics,” including Deborah A. Batts et al., and 
the Youth Law Center. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991); Press 
Release, Lambda Legal, supra note 86. 
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when their caregivers’ rights are adjudicated, and about current social 
science research related to child development.93 
Amicus briefs also add to any litigation in ways that go beyond 
their explication of the relevant law or social science. By presenting 
narratives of people who are affected by the issue before the court, they can 
illuminate the real-life consequences of a case and counter the abstract 
focus on doctrine that sometimes takes hold at the appellate level. Abortion 
rights advocates, for example, have used this type of story-telling brief to 
bring forward the stories of women who have been harmed by restrictions 
on access to abortion.94 In Alison D., the Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition 
International took up this task. Its brief told the actual stories of several 
families to show that when same-sex couples have children together, they, 
like heterosexual couples, do not consider one partner the “real” parent and 
the other partner just a supporting actor, as Virginia had characterized 
Alison. 
In addition to their substantive storytelling role, amicus briefs also 
make the court aware of the groups that have a stake in the case beyond the 
litigants. To be sure, some groups may have little influence in this regard 
because their support is predictable. The presence of a gay and lesbian 
parents group in the case, for example, was unlikely to add great weight in 
this respect, as few would be surprised to see advocates for legal 
recognition of gay-parented families coming into the case. 
But when organizations that are not presumptive allies file an 
amicus brief on a party’s behalf, they alert the court that support also exists 
from credible “outsiders.” For this reason, among others, Ettelbrick worked 
                                                 
93 New social science data at the time showed that a parent’s sexual orientation has 
no bearing on a child’s healthy emotional development. See, e.g., ROBERTA ACHTENBERG, 
LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 1-3 (1987); 
Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative Study of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children of Divorced 
Lesbian Mothers and Divorced Heterosexual Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 
(Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989). See generally GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (Frederick W. 
Bozett ed., 1987); Donna J. Hutchens & Martha J. Kirkpatrick, Lesbian Mothers/Gay 
Fathers, in EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 115 (Diane H. Schetky & 
Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1985). For a discussion of more recent research, see Charlotte J. 
Patterson et al., Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents: Research, Law, and Policy, in 
CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 176 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2002). 
94 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?—A Study of the 
Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 137, 170-71 (1990) (considering briefs that included the testimony of women who had 
had abortions); Sarah E. Burns, Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 198 (1990) (discussing a brief that summarized forty thousand women’s 
personal experiences with abortion). 
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intently to encourage NOW LDEF, the national women’s rights litigation 
group,95 to file a brief. Virginia’s focus on the exclusive rights of biological 
parents suggested that Alison’s theory would render all biological parents 
(including heterosexual single mothers) vulnerable to intrusive visitation 
claims by third parties (such as abusive boyfriends). NOW LDEF’s 
presence could assure the court that a prominent women’s rights 
organization had thoughtfully considered the risks and had concluded that 
Alison’s position protected parental rights while also serving children’s best 
interests. 
Similarly, the Youth Law Center’s brief conveyed to the court that 
an expert organization focused entirely on children’s well-being agreed 
with Alison that children are served best by maintaining ongoing 
relationships with the parent figures in their lives. The brief of the Eleven 
Concerned Academics, a consortium of family law scholars, also lent 
credibility to Alison’s arguments, at least to the extent that academics are 
understood to offer a reasoned and unbiased consideration of an issue.96 As 
a joint statement of family law scholars, the academics’ brief sent the 
message that the nation’s top experts found Alison’s position to be the 
better of the two. 
On a more political level, the brief for the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York (ABCNY), New York City’s twenty-thousand-plus 
member bar association,97 signaled that issue-oriented advocates and 
experts were not alone in their attention to this case. Moreover, by 
participating in the case, the ABCNY, as a relatively conservative and non-
partisan institution, conveyed that the court would not be going out on a 
radical political limb if it ruled in Alison’s favor. 
While we do not know whether Virginia and her lawyers solicited 
amicus briefs, the case reports indicate that none were filed to support her 
position. 
                                                 
95 The group is now known as Legal Momentum. Legal Momentum, About Us, 
http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/PageServer?pagename=aboutus_1 (last visited Mar. 29, 
2008). 
96 But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(describing “a law-profession culture[] that has largely signed on to the so-called 
homosexual agenda”). 
97 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, About Us, 
http://www.nycbar.org/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). 
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C. Oral Argument 
In March 1991, the New York Court of Appeals heard oral 
argument in the case, allotting each side thirty minutes. Ettelbrick, who 
argued first, was questioned intensely about the court’s role in interpreting 
the term “parent” in the habeas statute that governed visitation.  Associate 
(later Chief) Judge Judith S. Kaye asked, for example: “How would we not 
be fundamentally redefining the term ‘parent’ throughout the statutory law 
and the case law of the State of New York?”98 The court’s seven judges also 
pressed Ettelbrick on how the court could grant Alison standing to seek 
visitation without leaving all biological parents subject to suits from family 
friends, babysitters, or anyone else who had befriended the child. Ettelbrick 
responded by trying, yet again, to tell Alison’s story, reminding the court 
that Alison was not a transient interloper in someone else’s family but 
rather had actively planned, with Virginia, to bring a child into the world.99 
Despite Ettelbrick’s efforts, “several judges made it clear through their 
questions to lawyers that they [were] uneasy about the broad implications of 
the visitation case,” as the New York Times reported shortly after the 
argument.100 
Maccarini had great difficulty expressing Virginia’s side of the 
story, stumbling a number of times as he presented her position. Still, his 
bottom line was clear: “The respondent here is a parent of her child . . . . 
The appellant is not.”101 He continued: “And like any other parent, lesbian 
or not, the respondent has a right to raise her child as she sees fit and 
determine who her child can associate with.”102 Responding to the court’s 
concerns about the scope of judicial authority, he urged that any adjustment 
of visitation rights be left to the legislature.103 
                                                 
98 Kevin Sack, Visitation Case Could Redefine Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
1991, at 134 [hereinafter Sack, Visitation Case]. 
99 A videotape of Ettelbrick’s argument has been used in some law school classes 
to illustrate exemplary oral advocacy. Given the court’s decision in the case, however, the 
tape also serves as a reminder that the quality of argument is not necessarily a predictor of 
success. The tape of the oral argument can be ordered, for a fee, from Albany Law School. 
See supra note 13. 
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D. A Final Loss for Alison 
On May 2, 1991, nearly four years after Virginia unilaterally cut off 
Alison’s contact with Andrew, the Court of Appeals ruled, in a 6-1 per 
curiam opinion, that Alison, as a “biological stranger” to her son, had no 
standing to seek visitation: “[A]lthough petitioner apparently nurtured a 
close and loving relationship with the child, she is not a parent within the 
meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 70.”104 
The court’s brief opinion fully embraced Virginia’s position. “To 
allow the courts to award visitation . . . to a third person,” it held, “would 
necessarily impair the parents’ right to custody and control.”105 Relying in 
significant part on Ronald FF., the court observed that “[w]hile one may 
dispute in an individual case whether it would be beneficial to a child to 
have continued contact with a nonparent, the Legislature did not in section 
70 give such nonparent the opportunity to compel a fit parent to allow them 
to do so.”106 Having framed the issue as a conflict between the New York 
legislature’s intent and Alison’s aims, the court held that only the legislature 
could address Alison’s concerns.107 
Judge Kaye’s dissent, by contrast, embraced Alison’s 
characterization of the issue as implicating the rights of many adults who 
function in parent-like relationships with children. She wrote, “The Court’s 
decision, fixing biology as the key to visitation rights, has impact far 
beyond this particular controversy, one that may affect a wide spectrum of 
relationships—including those of longtime heterosexual stepparents, 
‘common-law’ and nonheterosexual partners such as involved here, and 
even participants in scientific reproduction procedures.”108 Observing that 
“more than 15.5 million children do not live with two biological parents, 
and that as many as 8 to 10 million children are born into families with a 
gay or lesbian parent,” Judge Kaye emphasized that “the impact of [the] 
decision falls hardest on the children of those relationships, limiting their 
opportunity to maintain bonds that may be crucial to their development.”109 
                                                 
104 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam). 
105 Id. at 29 (citing Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987)). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. 
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Judge Kaye added that the majority had expanded Ronald FF. beyond its 
original contours, and also contested the idea that granting standing to 
Alison would destabilize New York’s family law, noting that Braschi’s 
recognition of function over form “did not effect a wholesale change in the 
law.”110 
IV. THE DECISION’S AFTERMATH 
The day after the decision was handed down, Maccarini told the 
New York Times, “The ruling just confirms that if there is going to be a 
change in the definition of parent, this is not the forum for it,” and added, 
“There are just too many social issues here.”111 By contrast, there was a 
chorus of disappointment on the other side. Ettelbrick described the ruling 
as “a fairly major setback for the gay and lesbian rights movement because 
it says that society does not recognize our relationships.”112 William 
Rubenstein of the ACLU, who had represented the gay tenant in Braschi,113 
commented that the court “had the reality of family life staring them in the 
face and they blinked.”114 The executive director of NOW LDEF noted 
starkly “that the courthouse doors have been closed to millions of children 
being raised by caring people not biologically related to them.”115 
Alison’s lawyers were not only saddened for Alison and her son but 
were also worried that the decision would be followed wholesale by other 
state courts. And to some degree, that is what happened. For several years 
after Alison D., courts regularly rejected the claims of lesbian co-parents to 
maintain relationships with the children they had planned for and parented 
with their former partners. Within two months, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court rejected a non-biological mother’s claim for custody or visitation 
based on her status as an equitable or de facto parent.116 In 1997, the 
                                                 
110 Id. at 32. 
111 Kevin Sack, Lesbian Loses a Ruling on Parent’s Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
1991, at B1 [hereinafter Sack, Lesbian Loses]. 
112 Id. 
113 See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1989). 
114 Sack, Lesbian Loses, supra note 111. 
115 Gary Spencer, Mother’s Lesbian Partner Denied Visitation Rights, N.Y. L.J., 
May 3, 1991, at 1. 
116 In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), overruled by In re Custody of 
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
2008] Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation 335 
 
Vermont Supreme Court did the same, citing Alison D. for the proposition 
that a non-biological parent was not a parent for purposes of visitation 
rights.117 Notably, several courts also relied on Alison D. to deny standing to 
adults who had parented children while in heterosexual relationships, 
confirming the concerns of Alison’s lawyers that the decision would cast a 
broad, harmful shadow.118 
The legal fallout in the years immediately following Alison D. did 
not entirely track the New York Court of Appeals’ approach, however. In 
that first year, a New Mexico appellate court specifically rejected the 
reasoning in Alison D. and permitted a lesbian co-parent to seek visitation 
with the child she had been raising with her former partner.119 In 1995, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled its own version of Alison D. and 
granted standing to a lesbian co-parent on the ground that she was a de facto 
parent.120 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and a trial-level court 
in Missouri also both ruled that a non-biological lesbian parent had standing 
to bring a visitation petition.121 
Moreover, as is often the case, a loss in one area of the law spurs 
victories in a related area to redress problems left exposed by the loss. In 
New York, this victory, albeit a partial one, came in 1995 in two 
consolidated cases when the New York Court of Appeals affirmed that 
                                                 
117 Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689-90 (Vt. 1997). For other appellate 
rulings rejecting visitation claims by lesbian co-parents, see, for example, Music v. 
Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 
N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); 
Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1997). 
118 See, e.g., Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239-41 (App. Div. 2001) 
(invoking Alison D. to deny standing to a man who parented a child with his girlfriend from 
toddlerhood until age eight); Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788-90 (Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(holding that a non-biological father lacked standing under Alison D. to seek visitation even 
after having held the child out as his biological son for several years, including giving the 
child his name); cf. In re B.E.D., No. W2003-02026-COA-R3-JV, 2004 WL 572342, at *2 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2004) (relying on Alison D. to support the rejection of visitation 
rights for the child’s adult sibling). 
119 A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 
120 In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 419, overruling In re Z.J.H., 471 
N.W.2d 202. 
121 E.N.O. v. L.L.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 
1996 WL 393521 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 7, 1996). In In re T.L., the court held that an equitable 
parent would have standing to seek custody as well as visitation. Id. at *3. 
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unmarried adults can adopt their partners’ biological children.122 This 
practice is now widely known as second-parent adoption.123 The pair of 
cases involved two couples, one lesbian and the other heterosexual.124 The 
non-biological parent in each case, with the agreement of the biological 
parent, sought to adopt his or her partner’s child.125 This was an action that 
Alison and Virginia (along with most other lesbian and gay parents a 
decade earlier) had not even contemplated.126 Chief Judge Kaye wrote a 
lengthy opinion for the court that focused largely on statutory interpretation 
but also highlighted the policy arguments supporting adoption in these 
cases, particularly the issue of the child’s “emotional security . . . should the 
coparents separate.”127 “[V]iewed from the children’s perspective,” she 
noted, “permitting the adoptions allows the children to achieve a measure of 
permanency with both parent figures and avoids the sort of disruptive 
visitation battle we faced in [Alison D.].”128 
For Alison and her son, this important development came too late. 
Presumably, had second-parent adoption been available at the time Andrew 
was born, Virginia and Alison both would have wanted Alison to adopt 
Andrew to provide security for their family. Instead, the absence of legal 
rights for Alison in the early 1990s meant that Andrew lost one of his 
parents at an early age. But at least for many other families, the 
circumstances have continued to improve, with a significant jump in legal 
security for lesbian-headed families in recent years. Since 2000, most state 
appellate courts deciding cases like Alison D. have permitted lesbian co-
parents to seek custody or visitation after the termination of the adults’ 
relationship, embracing de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, and equitable 
                                                 
122 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995). 
123 See generally Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 
(2000). 
124 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 397. In re Jacob built on a New York Surrogate’s 
Court decision issued shortly after Alison D. that allowed a non-biological mother to adopt 
the child she was raising with her partner under the same adoption rules that apply to step-
parents. See In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992); see also In re 
Adoption of Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Fam. Ct. 1994). 
125 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398. 
126 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
127 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399. 
128 Id. (citing Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991)). 
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estoppel theories as a means of protecting the child’s best interests.129 In 
addition, second-parent adoption is widely, though not universally, 
available to secure the legal relationship between a non-biological parent 
and child.130 The changes can likely be attributed in large part to broader 
societal acceptance of lesbians and gay men and, more specifically, to 
greater acceptance of and familiarity with lesbian- and gay-parented 
families, though it is of course impossible to link the legal developments 
definitively to these societal changes.131 
The American Law Institute (ALI) has incorporated many of these 
developments into its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, which 
were adopted and promulgated in 2000.132 The Principles, which address 
issues ranging from custodial and decision-making responsibility to child 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); King v. S.B., 837 
N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005); V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); T.B. 
v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re 
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). In addition, in the course of holding a non-
biological lesbian parent liable for child support, the California Supreme Court disapproved 
of numerous prior rulings that non-biological lesbian mothers were not legal parents. See 
Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
By contrast, the Utah Supreme Court held in early 2007 that a lesbian co-parent 
did not have standing to seek visitation with the child she had been raising with her former 
partner, with whom she had entered into a civil union in Vermont.  See Jones v. Barlow, 154 
P.3d 808 (Utah 2007).  Similarly, in 2000, the Tennessee Court of Appeals relied on Alison 
D. to deny standing to two women who had been raising children with their former partners. 
See In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 922-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). 
For further discussion of the legal theories available to support standing for non-
biological parents, see Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002); 
Polikoff, supra note 17; Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 662-78 
(2002); Rachel E. Shoaf, Note, Two Mothers and Their Child: A Look at the Uncertain 
Status of Nonbiological Lesbian Mothers Under Contemporary Law, 12 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 267 (2005). 
130 See generally Sonja Larsen, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27 
A.L.R. 5th 54 (1995). Second-parent adoption is generally available to different-sex couples 
wherever it is available to same-sex couples. See Falk, supra note 123, at 94-95. 
131 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil 
Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006) 
(addressing the relationship between changing social views and legal change). 
132 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.03(1)(b)-(c), 2.18 (2002). 
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support and property distribution, devote extensive attention to the rights 
and responsibilities of adults who are not biologically or legally related to 
the children they parent.133 Most relevant to Alison’s situation, the 
Principles endorse legal recognition for a “parent by estoppel,” defined as 
an individual who has “lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding 
out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a 
prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent . . . to raise a 
child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities.”134 The 
Principles also provide for recognition of a “de facto parent,” defined as an 
individual who has resided with the child for at least two years and who 
regularly, “for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and 
with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship,” 
has performed significant parenting functions.135 In its commentary, the 
ALI explains that “[t]he standards reflect the societal consensus that 
responsibility for children ordinarily should be retained by a child’s parents, 
while recognizing that there are some exceptional circumstances in which 
the child’s needs are best served by continuity of care by other adults.”136 
Although the Principles are not binding on any state,137 they provide 
advocates for parents in Alison’s situation with additional important 
authority for their claims. 
New York, however, has kept the barrier to visitation (and custody) 
petitions frozen where it was in 1991. Lower courts continue to treat Alison 
D. as barring all equitable actions by non-legal lesbian parents. 
Consequently, non-legal lesbian parents who have not completed second-
parent adoptions remain shut out from even seeking visitation with the 
children they were raising with a former partner.138 In 2005, in a case 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(iii). Section (b) also provides alternate definitions for “parent 
by estoppel” under subsections (i), (ii), and (iv), which are not relevant here. See id. § 
2.03(1)(b). 
135 Id. § 2.03(1)(c). Section (c) also includes, within its definition of de facto 
parent, an adult who takes on the caretaking role as a result of the failure or inability of the 
legal parent to do so. See id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii). 
136 Id. § 2.18 cmt. a. 
137 Id. § 1.01 (defining a “rule of statewide application” as “a rule that implements 
a Principle set forth herein” and declaring that “a rule of statewide application may be 
established by legislative, judicial, or administrative action”). 
138 See, e.g., Behrens v. Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2006) (denying 
standing to a non-legal mother); Lee P.S. v. Lisa L., 753 N.Y.S.2d 860 (App. Div. 2003) 
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similar to Alison D., a New York family court explained that it considered 
itself 
[U]nfortunately constrained to find that petitioner lacks standing 
to seek visitation with the child who has enjoyed a close and 
loving relationship with petitioner since infancy, with no 
consideration as to any detriment such a harsh result will have on 
this child . . . . Given the frequency with which children today are 
being raised by and bonding with long-term heterosexual 
stepparents (who are equally affected by the holdings herein) and 
nonmarital homosexual partners, perhaps the time has come for 
the Court of Appeals to revisit its ruling in Alison D.139 
Arguably, a court could conclude that Alison D. is not such an 
absolute barrier. After all, the decision did not explicitly foreclose several 
equitable arguments that the legal parent’s cultivation of the other adult’s 
parental role requires recognition of the non-legal parent. Indeed, New York 
courts have applied equitable theories in cases decided after Alison D. to 
recognize the rights of functional (but non-legal) fathers seeking visitation 
against the wishes of the child’s biological mother.140 Yet these same courts 
have refused to carry over this reasoning to cases where the parents are of 
the same sex, raising equal protection concerns that courts have not 
addressed.141 
                                                                                                                 
(same); Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 2002) (same); Speed v. 
Robins, 732 N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div. 2001) (same); Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673 
N.Y.S.2d 989 (App. Div. 1998) (same); C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(same). The courts would presumably apply the same ruling to petitions brought by a non-
legal gay father, but there are no reported cases with those facts. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I presented oral argument on behalf of the non-legal parent in the appellate 
litigation of Behrens. 
139 See Same-Sex Partner Lacks Standing to Seek Visitation Rights with Ex-
Partner’s Adopted Child, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 2005, at 21 (reprinting unpublished opinion in 
Denise B. v. Beatrice R.). 
140 See, e.g., Gilbert A. v. Laura A., 689 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 1999) (granting 
standing to a man who functioned as the child’s father, but lacked biological ties, to show 
that extraordinary circumstances existed to justify custody or visitation with the child born 
during his marriage to the child’s mother, and basing the order in part on the mother’s direct 
involvement in cultivating the parent-child relationship); Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 
N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1998) (allowing a functional, but not biological, father to invoke 
equitable estoppel to continue his relationship with the child born during his marriage to the 
child’s mother). 
141 For the first time ever, a New York Supreme Court ruling recently 
distinguished Alison D. in a lesbian co-parent dispute and found that equitable estoppel 
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Even with this uninviting landscape, parents in New York with no 
other options continue to bring (and lose) claims to maintain their 
relationships with their children, though their case presentation strategy has 
adjusted with the times. Litigators no longer need to explain, for example, 
that lesbian couples have children or provide courts with background on 
physician-assisted insemination. At the same time, however, courts often 
ask lawyers to explain why the non-legal parent did not complete a second-
parent adoption to secure her ties to the child while the couple was 
together.142 In fact, many couples deliberately delay the adoption process,143 
though not typically out of a lack of commitment, as judges sometimes 
assume. Instead, as with other legal protections that people should pursue 
but often do not (like making a will), couples delay second-parent adoption 
for a range of reasons. For example, the process can be expensive for 
couples who, in many cases, need to hire not only a lawyer but also a social 
worker to do an in-home evaluation. Some couples who plan to have more 
than one child simply find it more efficient and economical to wait to do all 
of the adoptions together.144 In addition, couples seeking to adopt another 
child from a country that disfavors same-sex couples may delay the 
adoption process to avoid exposing their relationship and jeopardizing their 
opportunity to adopt a sibling for their child(ren).145 Yet, even courts well-
informed about the reasons for delayed adoption, about cases granting 
equitable relief to functional fathers, and about the myriad other changes in 
                                                                                                                 
principles authorized the non-biological mother’s standing to seek a continued relationship 
with her children. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008).   Unlike other 
cases in which Alison D.’s holding was enforced to deny parental status to the non-legal 
parent, the adults in this case had married each other in Canada, and the court found the 
marriage to be a “significan[t]” additional factor in its determination.  Id. at 509.  The trial 
court also relied on a 2006 ruling in which the New York Court of Appeals estopped a non-
biological father from denying paternity of a child he had supported and visited 
intermittently.  Id. at 507 (citing Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006)).  
142 E-mail Interview with Judith E. Turkel, Partner, Turkel Forman & de la Vega 
LLP (Mar. 14, 2008) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Turkel Interview]. Ms. Turkel is a 
New York City-based lawyer with more than two decades of experience representing lesbian 
and gay parents. Turkel Forman & de la Vega LLP, Judith E. Turkel, 
http://www.tfvlaw.com/judith.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). 
143 Turkel Interview, supra note 142. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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recognition of the rights of gay people continue to adhere rigidly to Alison 
D.146 
Similarly, the state legislature has made no significant effort to 
reverse the effects of Alison D. In the wake of many significant legislative 
efforts to secure marriage rights for same-sex couples,147 this inaction might 
seem surprising. On the other hand, it took New York until 2002 to amend 
the state’s antidiscrimination law to cover sexual orientation,148 something 
twelve other states had already accomplished at that point.149 Other 
provisions of the state’s family law that likewise are arguably in need of 
revision—such as the divorce law, which, unlike the law in any other state, 
requires a showing of adultery or a legal separation agreement before 
authorizing divorce150—have endured without effective legislative reform 
for many years despite significant criticism.151 
                                                 
146 See, e.g., Behrens v. Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2006). 
147 The New York State Assembly has considered, but has not voted on, bills 
granting marriage to same-sex couples for several years. For updated information, see 
Empire State Pride Agenda, Legislation and Other Governmental Action, 
http://www.prideagenda.org/IssuesExplained/MarriageandFamilyProtection/LegislationandO
therGovernmentAction/tabid/71/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Empire State 
Pride Agenda is New York’s statewide legislative advocacy organization for the rights of 
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender individuals. See Empire State Pride Agenda, 
Our Mission and Public Policy, http://www.prideagenda.org/AboutUs/OurMissionand 
PublicPolicy/tabid/55/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Many of the Pride Agenda’s 
recent family law reform efforts have focused on securing protections for adult relationships 
either by marriage or other means. See, e.g., Empire State Pride Agenda, Marriage and 
Family Protection, http://dnn.prideagenda.org/IssuesExplained/MarriageandFamily 
Protection/tabid/67/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). 
148 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 292, 296 (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2007). Sections 
291, 292, and 296 set forth New York’s protected classes for antidiscrimination purposes in 
the context of, inter alia, employment, housing, education, and places of public 
accommodation. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was not prohibited under 
these sections until 2002. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291, L.2002, ch. 2 (effective 2003). 
149 See Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, New York Outlaws Anti-Gay 
Discrimination (Dec. 17, 2002), http://www.prideagenda.org/tabid/304/default.aspx?c=272. 
150 New York is now the only state in the country to “require[] the finding of fault 
or living apart pursuant to a legal document as a basis for divorce.” S.C. v. A.C., 798 
N.Y.S.2d 348 at *5 (2004) (unpublished table decision). 
151 See, e.g., Molinari v. Molinari, 839 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2007) (unpublished table 
decision) (identifying problems flowing from existing law and calling for legislative action). 
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V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
One might ask, in light of the law’s intransigence in New York, 
why bother? Is law reform litigation in this area, no matter how carefully 
crafted, an exercise in futility? Certainly, if one evaluates the work by the 
win-loss record of advocates for non-legal lesbian mothers in New York 
during the past decade, there would seem to be little value in continuing to 
seek law reform on this issue. 
Yet to stop now would be to miss one of the central points of law 
reform litigation. As discussed at the outset, law reform cases are defined, 
in part, by an effort to move beyond the status quo and change the law in 
ways that advocates believe are in the interest of justice. Winning a lawsuit 
can accomplish this, of course. Even when cases are lost, however, the very 
act of litigating against injustice can sometimes be an important step toward 
a victory on a similar issue in a subsequent lawsuit. The drumbeat of 
lawsuits maintains both public and legal attention, helping to ensure that 
this class of litigants will not be forgotten. Further, repeated, unsuccessful 
litigation shows, in stark relief, the terrible losses caused by an approach to 
family law that, in this area, is unresponsive to family life. The litigation, in 
other words, helps shape the public conversation. It frames a problem and 
proposes a solution. 
Consequently, although lawyers for individuals like Alison 
continue to engage the same types of strategic questions about how best to 
persuade courts to recognize family relationships that are visible 
everywhere except in the law, the backdrop against which they are working 
is different, and richer, than when Alison first brought her case. There is 
now a documented history of the custody and visitation law’s non-
responsiveness to families in which one parent is legally recognized and the 
other is not.  In this history lies the opportunity for law reform efforts to 
continue, and for advocates to work on framing and reframing the story so 
that, one day, telling the family story in this kind of case will become run-
of-the-mill family court conflict-resolution fare, rather than an achievement 
in and of itself. 
